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identify locality, rather than to make more certain any limits or
bounds in the deed. It would be a hazardous policy to allow a
grantor to lessen the amount of land apparently conveyed by his
deed by a general reference to some other deed or paper. Imposition could be easily practiced under such a rule, as grantees rarely
pay much attention to such references, or know whether they affect
their interests or not." (Italics supplied.)
It is admitted that the cases considered in this comment are
not specifically pointed toward the quantum of interest conveyed.
The cases seem to make no distinction between quantum of interest and physical quantity of land in so far as the descriptive
language used is concerned. Our court states that the intention of
the parties controls as to the quantum of interest conveyed. There
seems to be no reason why the same language should not manifest
the same intention as to quantum of interest that it manifests toward physical quantity of land. The cases seem to draw a line as
to the effect of such a reference back between a general reference
and a specific or particular reference, holding particular references
to be controlling, but not giving such weight to a general reference. For a reference to be particular there apparently must be
some language in addition to a bare statement of source of title,
from which the court can find an intention of the grantor to include
the document referred to within the present description. On this
basis, it appears that the West Virginia court has given a general
reference a controlling effect. The possible consequences of such
a decision seem adequately pointed out in the quoted portion from
the Webster Woolen Co. case, supra.
J. K. B.

DIVORCE-FUTURE INSTALLMENTS OF ALIMONY OR MAINTENANCE

AUTOMATIC LIEN.-In a vendors' action for specific performance
and to quiet title with regard to an alleged defect founded upon
a decree for divorce and maintenance money for the support of
minor children, the Iowa court held than an installment or support
money judgment does not constitute an automatic lien upon real
estate for future unpaid installments. Slack v. Mullenix, 66
N.W.2d 99 (Iowa, 1954).
The cases throughout the United States are in conflict as to
whether a decree for alimony or maintenance money will in itself
operate as a lien on the defendant's realty. -That the decree will
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not, see Chero-Cola Co. v. May, 169 Ga. 273, 149 S.E. 895 (1929); that
it will, see Bray v. Landergren, 161 Va. 699, 172 S.E. 252 (1934).
However, the purpose of this comment is to point out the position
of the West Virginia court on this specific question: Does a divorce
decree providing for alimony or maintenance money for minor
children constitute an automatic lien on defendant's realty as to
future installments? Our court has said that there is no rational
basis for a distinction between alimony decreed to be paid to a
wife and sums to be paid to her for the maintenance of children.
Korczyk v. Solonka, 130 W. Va. 211, 42 S.E.2d 814 (1947); see also
Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W. Va.160, 50 S.E.2d 455 (1948).
The first case in this state which declared future installments
to be a lien on the defendant's realty was Goff v. Goff, 60 W. Va. 9,
53 S.E. 769 (1906). There the wife was awarded annual alimony,
payable quarterly, and the decree declared the alimony a lien on
the husband's realty, though it was payable in installments in the
future. The court based its decision on a West Virginia statute,
substantially the same as W. VA. CODE C. 38, art. 3, § 6 (Michie,
1949), providing that every judgment or decree for money shall be
a lien upon the defendant's land. That the court may declare the
lien in the decree, see Goff v. Goff, supra; Foggin v. Furbee, 89
W. Va. 170, 109 S.E. 754 (1921); Reynalds v. Reynolds, 68 W. Va.
15, 24, 69 S.E. 381, 385 (1910).
The question of the automatic lien was squarely before the
court in Gain v. Gerling, 109 W. Va. 241, 153 S.E. 504 (1930). The
supreme court, in reversing the lower court, followed the Gofi
case and held the future installments to be a lien. To the same
effect, see Korczyk v. Solonka, supra; Holcomb v. Holcomb, 122
W. Va. 293, 295, 8 S.E.2d 889, 890 (1940). It is to be noted that in
the Gain, Holcomb and Korczyk cases the decree did not declare
the lien, yet the court by decision, citing the Goff case, found the
lien to exist both as to matured and future installments.
As the law in West Virginia stands today, the court, under
statutory interpretation, has the power to make a decree for alimony or support money a lien on the husband's realty for both
matured and future installments; in the absence of such a recital
in the decree the same result is reached under court decisions. The
result reached by our court seems not a desirable one. The Iowa
court, in Slack v. Mullenix, supra, reacles a better result. Where
the decree has been docketed, thus affording constructive notice
to subsequent parties, or where such parties have actual notice
of the decree, the result reached by the West Virginia court will
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serve to restrain the transfer or encumbrance by the husband of
his realty. United States v. Spangler, 94 F. Supp. 301 (W. Va.
1950). Under the present law of West Virginia there seems to be
no way to discharge the lien. United States v. Spangler, supra.
This is true though the husband has never defaulted in payment,
is solvent and apparently will remain solvent. Since the position
of our court is well settled, it would seem that the problem is a
proper one for legislation. A procedure should be provided whereby,
in a proper case, the lien could be discharged. For example, the
legislature could provide for a lump sum payment of the future
installments to become due based on the life expectancy of the
wife.
Public policy should not support a rule of law which operates
as a major restraint upon alienation of realty.
L. H. H.

FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION-CONDITIONAL BEQUESTS TO

CHARITY

established a testamentary trust for the joint
lives of his wife and daughter, and the life of the survivor, with remainder to the living descendants of the daughter, or in their
absence, one-half to collateral relatives and one-half to a charity,
or if no named collaterals then survived, all to the charity. At
S's death his daughter was twenty-seven years old, divorced, and
childless. The executor deducted in the estate tax return the
actuarially computed present value of the conditional bequest of
one-half of the residue, without deduction for the half subject to
the more remote contingency. The deduction was disallowed by
the commissioner but sustained by the tax court in Estate of Sternberger v. Comm'r, 18 T.C. 836 (1952), afJ'd, 207 F.2d 600 (2d Cir.
1953). Held, reversed. No deduction is allowable unless the
possibility that charity will not take is so remote as to be negligible.
Comm'r v. Estate of Sternberger, 75 Sup. Ct. 229 (1955) (6-2
decision.)
The statute allows deduction from the gross estate of transfers
for public, charitable, or religious uses in determining the taxable
-No
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estate.

INT.
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CODE § 812 (d). These provisions remain un-

changed in the 1954 code. Id. at §§ 2051, 2055.
Humes v. United States, 276 U.S. 487 (1927), established the
doctrine that this does not authorize deduction for a contingent
gift to a charity where the bequest is incapable of evaluation in a
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